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ABSTRACT
The Chinese Internet has developed rapidly in the past decade and
given rise to many online phenomena, including digital vigilantism
(DV). It refers to citizens’ practice of weaponising online visibility for
retaliation when collectively offended. In China, since the Cat Torture
Case in 2006, DV has been widely adopted by citizens to defend
social norms and values. With recent technological developments
and socio-political changes in China, how Chinese citizens conduct
DV and its influence have also changed along various dimensions.
This research, therefore, identifies the historical changes of DV in
China and situates these changes in relation to contemporary
Chinese technological and socio-political development. The study
constructs a database of 1265 Chinese DV cases that receive media
coverage between 2006 to 2018 and conducts a thematic analysis to
identify characteristics, changes, and trends of DV in China. The
author argues that these developments demonstrate the mediation
and more importantly, the mediatisation of justice-seeking on the
Chinese Internet conditioned by the ubiquitous state power.
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The 2006 Cat Torture Case marks one of the first efforts of online collective action
against an individual citizen to protect a shared value (Han, 2018)—in this case, animal
rights and welfare. A video clip of a woman crushing a kitten’s skull with her high
heels led to a large-scale campaign to expose her identity on an online forum, Mop
Forum. The woman’s personal information—including her name, job, address, and
phone number—was published online after a four-day search (ibid.). Due to this
campaign’s social impact, some press followed the story and reported on the case,
but only afterwards. The incident ended with the woman’s resignation from her job
but without the government’s direct involvement or her employer’s. This case’s pro-
cess is relatively straightforward with two major actors involved: the cat-torturing
woman and the angered Chinese netizens.
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In November 2016, a Chinese female student, Jiang Ge, was killed in Japan. The
killer was her best friend Liu’s ex-boyfriend. Later on Sina Weibo, the victim’s mother,
Jiang Qiulian, published Liu’s personal information, their private conversations and the
phone call recording in which Liu’s parents insulted her, and blamed Liu and her fam-
ily for Jiang Ge’s death and their indifference. Small-scale attention on this case and
shaming on Liu was observed, but the incident did not make a nation-wide impact
yet. However, in November 2017, after a commercial online media channel, Jumian
[The Situation], made a special issue on this incident, interviewing and setting up a
meeting for the two parties, the incident immediately became a national trending
topic on various social media platforms, leading to later rounds and larger scale of
shaming and harassment on Liu. Meanwhile, Liu and several public opinion leaders
started to question Jiang’s mother’s motive, which triggered some netizens to shame
Jiang’s mother. People’s Daily, the newspaper directly run by the Chinese government,
also discussed the moral and legal implications of this case in a commentary (People’s
Daily, 2017). In January 2018, two public opinion leaders who supported Liu posted
about disputes between them and Liu and exposed their previous attempt to sway
the public opinion, which turned many former supporters against all three of them.
This incident’s process is complex, with various actors involved and controversies last-
ing more than one year on multiple social media platforms.
Netizens’ practice of collectively naming and shaming targets in incidents similar to
above-mentioned cases is often named as wangluo zhengyi [online justice] in China.
Some influential cases of this phenomenon are studied through the concept new
media event/incident (also as Internet event/incident) by Chinese media scholars (Fang,
2014; Zeng et al., 2014; Liu, 2015; Wu & Liu, 2018), which has been widely used since
Qiu and Chan (2009, 2011) co-edited book New Media Events Research. In the early
2010s, this concept is usually broadly and descriptively defined as “public events
where large numbers of citizens participate in often unorganised, autonomous online
efforts to express their sentiments and opinions, address collective needs, or influence
public opinion and policy” (Jiang, 2014, p. 211). However, this descriptive definition is
unproductive in contemporary society since almost all influential public events are
entangled with new media (Qiu & Miao, 2016). Therefore, scholars suggest using this
concept as an analytical perspective to understand how power dynamics between
social actors are formed in such cases (ibid.; Wu, 2014). Bearing this analytical perspec-
tive in mind, the author intends to study not only Chinese online justice cases that
are historically significant as new media events (Dayan & Katz as cited in Qiu & Miao,
2016), but also common cases that demonstrate how Chinese citizens seek personal
justice by retaliating individuals online. Hence, online justice in China is studied in this
research as digital vigilantism (DV), a more specific concept coined by Trottier (2017),
referring to citizens engaging in practices that weaponise an individual’s online visibil-
ity as retaliation or punishment when they perceive the individual as breaking certain
legal or moral boundaries. Three elements are crucial for defining DV: (i) the targets of
DV activities are individuals, instead of social or state institutions; (ii) DV activities are
primarily conducted for retaliating or punishing the targets, instead of only for truth-
seeking or initiating social movements (despite the possibility of containing or further
developing into truth-seeking or social movements); (iii) different from another
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commonly-used concept cybersecurity vigilantism (Silva, 2018), which refers to non-
state actors using informal means to counter criminal behaviours, digital vigilantism
counters not only formal crimes but also any behaviours that are deemed offensive.
The practices adopted by vigilantes to retaliate or punish perceived offenders—the
repertoire (Moncada, 2017)—include recording and publishing evidence online, identi-
fying and making individual’s information visible online without his/her consent, sham-
ing, physical violence, and/or the threat of using physical violence (Trottier, 2017).
Since 2006 when the Cat Torture Case marks the national influence of this phenom-
enon, DV has been widely adopted by Chinese citizens to defend social norms and
values shared by groups and communities. Through comparing the above two cases,
some changes of Chinese DV practices seem to emerge: (i) the process is longer and
more complex; (ii) more actors and stakeholders are directly involved in the develop-
ment of cases, especially key opinion leaders, professional media, and the state; (iii)
DV incidents are fermented on multiple social media platforms simultaneously with
more significant social impact; (iv) the justifications of DV incidents can spark more
controversies. Even though the comparison based only on these two cases is insuffi-
cient for a direct conclusion, it warrants further investigation on the historical develop-
ment of DV incidents in China.
When discussing the relationship between DV activities and society, Trottier (2020)
proposes a tentative DV model explaining the dynamics: on the one hand, DV activ-
ities are conditioned by many aspects of society, such as morality, group identity, con-
fidence in the state, platform settings, legislation, and media cultures; on the other
hand, mediated policing and denunciation in DV cases can in turn shape and influ-
ence these social conditions. Based on this model, changes observed in DV practices
can provide a window to see which and how social conditions have changed in China
from 2006—especially the (media) technological, social-cultural, and political ones.
This research, therefore, aims to address the historical changes of digital vigilantism in
China and situate these changes in relation to contemporary Chinese technological
and socio-political development by adopting the concepts of mediation and mediatisa-
tion. The author argues that these changes can be understood as a demonstration of
the mediation and mediatisation of justice-seeking in China. The former concept analy-
ses the immediate and concrete impact of communicating via a medium, while the
latter focuses on the long-term and structural impact of media as an independent
social institution (Hjarvard, 2008), both of which will be further discussed in later part
of this article.
Understanding digital vigilantism in China via human flesh search
The concept of digital vigilantism has not been widely applied in empirical research in
the Chinese context. However, in addition to previously mentioned general concept
new media events, another concept human flesh search (HFS)—also often called
Internet crowdsourcing—that closely resembles DV has been extensively studied. It
refers to the voluntary online participation that attracts and demands citizens’ collect-
ive efforts to conduct a people-powered search to identify a target or reveal the truth
(Heng et al., 2019). Unlike DV, HFS can sometimes be triggered by non-offence-based
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reasons—such as identifying an attractive person—and it only refers to one repertoire
(Moncada, 2017) of DV, which is seeking and publishing individuals’ personal informa-
tion (doxing). Therefore, HFS cannot be regarded as equivalent to DV. However, the
HFS literature is still relevant for studying Chinese DV given that most HFS research
focuses on cases triggered by perceived offences, and most of the participants in HFS
cases also resort to other DV repertoires in addition to doxing.
Researchers have approached HFS from various perspectives. A significant propor-
tion of HFS research emphasises the legal and ethical implications of HFS in cases that
target civilian individuals. Cheung (2009) examines the legal case in which Wang,
whose personal information was made public on the Internet due to his infidelity,
sued websites for a privacy violation, and suggests an urgent need to reform personal
information and privacy laws. Examining the same case, Bu (2013) advocates for more
specific regulations and laws and suggests that the rise of HFS as a form of online
vigilantism will lead to dramatic restrictions imposed by the government. In addition
to above-mentioned points, Zhang and Gao (2016) also consider the self-regulation of
Internet service providers and social campaigns of privacy protection and morality as
potential solutions. When approaching HFS from a legal perspective, the implied nor-
mative judgement is mostly negative, with concerns on privacy and violence.
Another group of scholars mainly discusses the social and political implications of
cases that target government officials. They argue that anti-corruption HFS shows the
awakening of Chinese civic consciousness (Cheong & Gong, 2010) and helps to hold
officials and government accountable for their behaviours and claims (Gao & Stanyer,
2014). While most research demonstrates a cautiously positive attitude towards such
cases targeting officials, some scholars also take its complexity into accounts. Gorman
(2016) points out that while HFS targeting officials damages the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) ’s legitimacy, it also acts as a safety valve for social frustration and a chan-
nel to gather and evaluate public opinions. The nuances between the central govern-
ment and local government also determine how these incidents develop: citizens are
relatively free to criticise the local government, while attacks on the central govern-
ment are largely suppressed (Herold, 2008).
When the cases are not chosen discriminatively based on their targets, most of the
research ends with the argument of HFS being a double-edged sword. Chen and
Sharma (2011) argue that HFS both fight and deter illegal and unethical behaviours,
and invade individuals’ privacy and potentially discourage Internet usage. A similar
conclusion is provided by Chang and Leung (2015), arguing that HFS can both help
punish bad behaviours and maintain social justice, as well as damage people’s lives
and reputation. This type of research provides a sound basis for studying HFS and DV
in China, yet hardly taps into a more in-depth analysis.
Compared to various scholars’ historical approach to study the broader new media
events (Fang, 2014; Zeng et al., 2014; Liu, 2015; Wu & Liu, 2018), HFS researchers usu-
ally refer to HFS as a monolithic and continuous phenomenon without change. This
tendency leads to a partial picture of HFS as the ever-changing social conditions in
contemporary China are not accounted for. One research that bridges this gap is
Feng’s (2012) quantitative empirical research. He concludes that HFS incidents before
2007 are mainly triggered by unethical acts, while concerns about public interests
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become the dominant causes after that year. Feng’s research on HFS illustrates the
need to look into and contextualise potential fundamental changes in Chinese HFS.
While useful, Feng’s data include HFS cases not triggered by offensive conducts,
meaning that they are not all DV cases. Moreover, his data collection ends in 2011,
which makes his findings and arguments not directly applicable to this article’s scope.
Besides, China has experienced many technological, political, and societal changes
since President Xi took power, especially in relation to media, including the fast devel-
opment of digital technologies, the increasing ideological propaganda, and the tight-
ening control over public opinions (Repnikova, 2017). These call for in-depth research
on historical changes of DV, a form of mediated collective action, in relation to the
current social conditions in China.
In the previous HFS literature, discussions on social media platforms are provided only
in a more general manner, with insufficient attention to specific technological features
related to netizens’ practices. Meanwhile, computer science scholars provide analyses on
how specific platform features and networks enable fast and large-scale dissemination of
information (Cheng et al., 2012; B. Wang et al., 2009; F. Wang et al., 2010) while leaving
socio-political factors out of consideration, which is understandable given their disciplinary
focus and approach. However, to address the research question of this article comprehen-
sively, both aforementioned perspectives should be considered. This need can be
addressed by introducing the concept of platform affordances. First coined by Gibson
(1979), affordance refers to the possibility of action offered by a given technology, which
is later applied to media studies as the possibility provided by media’s technological, aes-
thetic, and social characteristics that enable, limit, and structure social communication and
interactions (Hjarvard, 2014). By using the term affordance, researchers can include analy-
ses of both the materiality of technology (Hutchby, 2001)and the perceived affordances
(Norman, 1999), enabling discussions on how technological characteristics—platform fea-
tures in the case of studying social media—create possibilities for users, as well as how
users’ agency impacts these possibilities.
Therefore, inspired by the historical approach taken by Feng and above-mentioned
new media events scholars, and adopting the concept of media affordances, this article
sets out to identify historical developments of Chinese DV by constructing and examining
a database of empirical DV cases from 2006 to 2018, and then develop an in-depth ana-
lysis of the dynamics between DV activities, technologies, and the Chinese society.
Methodology
The research first constructs an empirical Chinese DV case database for the years 2006
to 2018. Because DV cases depend on weaponising the target’s online visibility, they
can be collected based on the amount of media attention the incidents acquire.
Therefore, cases that gain coverage from major news outlets from 2006 to 2018,
including traditional and social media, are collected. The collection is conducted
through theory-driven keyword searches mainly in WiseNews Database, supplemented
by Sina Weibo searches. WiseNews Database is chosen because it is the world’s largest
database for Chinese news coverage ranging from print to the web and social media
content at the amount of over 470,000 sources dating back to 1979 (Wisers, 2018).
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Even though the search results on Sina Weibo are incomplete due to deletion and cen-
sorship, data collected on Sina Weibo can serve as a verification of previously-collected
WiseNews data as well as a supplementary dataset due to the platform’s central role in
presenting public opinions in China (Jiang, 2010). Based on the definition of digital vigi-
lantism and the term human flesh search that is often used by Chinese media, the follow-
ing combination of keywords are used: (i) “fennu” [angry], which indicates being
collectively offended, AND “wangluo baoguang/wangbao” [online exposure] OR “wangyou
bao” [netizens report on someone], which refer to rendering targets visible online; (ii)
“fennu” [angry] AND “renrou” [human flesh] OR “renrou sousuo” [human flesh search].
The constructed database includes 1265 popular Chinese DV cases occurring
between 2006 to 2018. Cases are coded thematically and inductively in the following
categories: initiator(s), platform(s) used by the initiator(s) and participants, target, reper-
toire(s), justification(s), and outcome. Initiator(s) is coded into organised/existing groups
or individuals. The platform(s) used by DV participants includes foreign platforms,
forums/Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), personal blogs, video-sharing platforms, Sina
Weibo, WeChat (incl. Moments, group chat, and public account), and others. The target
refers to the individual who is perceived to have violated certain formal or informal
rules, such as laws, regulations, moralities, or some orders that are established by vari-
ous non-state actors (Moncada, 2017). In this research, the target (deemed by partici-
pants) is coded into civilian, government personnel, and celebrity. Repertoire(s) refers
to the practices that vigilantes utilise to retaliate against others (ibid.), which in this
research is coded into publishing visual evidence, seeking and/or publishing personal
information (doxing), boycotting, harassing, physical harm, and reporting to the insti-
tution(s). Justification(s) looks at the way vigilantes publicly legitimise their activities
(ibid.), which is coded into abusing public power/resource, animal brutality, economic
crime/conflict, incivility, indifference/disrespect/insulting, sexual offence, sexual scandal,
demonstration of wealth/social status, traffic transgression, unpatriotic speech/action,
unprofessional/unsafe conduct, violence/physical harm, and others in this research.
Outcome refers to how the case concluded, which is coded into with institutional pun-
ishment (when administrative or legal punishment from the government and any form
of punishment from the target’s employer is publicly announced), with no institutional
punishment (when there is no institution involved or the institution announces no
punishment after its investigation), and unclear (when no clear decision or no follow-
up announcement are is made after the initial institutional response of starting an
investigation). It should be noted that in categories of platform(s), repertoire(s), and jus-
tification(s), multiple codes can be applied to one case.
After the initial analysis, codes were grouped by year, counted, and compared in
order to identify characteristics, changes, and trends of DV in China, supplemented
with a close reading into some representative cases in order to provide a more
detailed and in-depth description and analysis of general codes in the later discussion.
Results
Based on coding and initial observation of the constructed case database, several
characteristics and trends of Chinese DV activities can be identified. The most
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prominent characteristic of Chinese DV cases is that they are mainly initiated by indi-
viduals spontaneously rather than existing organisations. Among the 1265 Chinese DV
cases between 2006 to 2018, there are only eleven cases that are started by organisa-
tions, most of which are media companies. Compared to DV activities in some coun-
tries like Russia (Gabdulhakov, 2018) and Slovakia (Vicenova, 2020), Chinese DV cases
are rarely initiated by vigilante groups with a clear organisation and mission. This may
result from the Chinese government’s tight control over civic society, especially on
forms potentially leading to collective actions (Herold, 2008). As demonstrated in
Table 1, justifications provided by Chinese DV participants are highly diverse, ranging
from illegal conduct, unethical behaviours, to some more controversial or less univer-
sal norms, with violence/physical harm as the most common justification. In many
cases, multiple justifications are provided. For instance, a single anti-corruption case
often includes combined justifications of abusing public power/resource and sexual
scandal/violence. The justifications that rank top three in case numbers are illegal con-
duct, followed by conduct deemed unethical or immoral in China (e.g., disrespect,
incivility, sexual scandal, animal brutality, demonstrating wealth).
In terms of the yearly differences in case numbers of each justification, visible pat-
terns are found in categories of abusing public power/resource, sexual offence, incivility,
demonstrating wealth/social status, and unpatriotic speech/action, while other categories
remain steady or fluctuating without an identifiable trend (see the detail data in
Appendix). The numbers of DV cases triggered by abusing public power/resource and
demonstrating wealth/social status shown in Figure 1 demonstrate a shared trend of a
higher frequency between 2007 to 2012. The decrease of demonstrating wealth from
2011 can be well explained by the intimidation caused by the high-profile Guo
Meimei case1 in that year. Meanwhile, the case numbers of some other DV justifica-
tions exhibit an opposite trend. Cases caused by sexual offence and incivility are grad-
ually taking up a larger share during the period 2009 to 2018, which seems to be in
accordance with relevant ideological debates or trendy topics on Chinese social media.
In terms of DV activities targeting individuals who are spotted with unpatriotic speech
or action, the case number peaks in 2007 and remains high until 2009, which can be
explained by the relatively high level of nationalism in those years due to the 2008
Beijing Olympics (Schneider, 2018). After a low point in 2012, such DV cases experi-
ence a mild increase from 2013 to 2018.
Table 1. Justifications of DV activities in China between 2006 to 2018.
Justification Case Number
Violence/physical harm 388













The data also show changes in DV targets as can be seen in Figure 2. From 2007,
DV cases targeting government personnel start to increase gradually, matching Feng’s
(2012) finding of the shift in focus of HFS to public causes from 2007. In accordance
with the trends of DV incidents caused by abusing public power/resource and demon-
strating wealth/social status, such type of DV activity demonstrates a downward trend
after 2012 while the percentage of DV cases targeting civilians understandably exhibits
a reverse trend. Celebrities are always a marginal group to be targeted, yet a slight
increase from 2016 can be observed from the data, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 1. case number percentages of DV incidents with selected justifications from 2006 to 2018.
Figure 2. case number percentages of various DV targets from 2006 to 2018.
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Illustrated by Figure 3, Chinese DV participants’ platform choices vary during the thir-
teen years as well. From 2006 to 2010, forums and bulletin board system (BBS) are the
main digital platforms used by DV participants, such as Mop Forum, Tianya BBS, Baidu
BBS, and various local forums. These platforms share certain features and affordances
that facilitate and encourage DV activities, which will be further explained in the discus-
sion. As for Sina Weibo, even though it was established in 2009, it did not become the
primary platform for DV activities until 2011, which coincides with the start of large-scale
civic engagement on Sina Weibo in that year (Yang, 2012). Since then, Sina Weibo has
always been the central platform for DV activities. In addition to Sina Weibo, WeChat—
with its functions of Moment, group chat, and public account—has also become a
popular platform for citizens to conduct DV from 2014. Some DV activities use both
WeChat and Sina Weibo for maximum visibility. Besides above-mentioned major plat-
forms, video sharing platforms are often used by DV participants since 2009, usually for
initial discovery or evidence storage. The changes of platform choices coincide with the
general Chinese Internet development history (Yang, 2012), and require further detailed
analysis specifically in relation to Chinese DV activities in the latter part of the article.
During these thirteen years, Chinese DV participants develop various combinations
of repertoires in different periods. As observed in Figure 4, by 2010, the major reper-
toires are doxing, publishing visual evidence, and harassing—often used simultaneously.
Since 2011, the repertoire of reporting to institution starts gaining popularity among
Chinese DV participants; in 2018, there are cases where participants only resort to
reporting to institutions without doxing. The shift of repertoire combinations occurs in
2011 when Chinese DV participants replace harassing with reporting to the institution
when encountering offences. The data also shows that physically harming targets is
always the least chosen repertoire. There is also a soft increase of boycotting as reper-
toire since celebrities become DV targets more often from 2016.
Figure 3. platforms used by DV participants in China between 2006 to 2018.
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In accordance with the increase of reporting to institutions as repertoire, there are
less DV cases left unpunished by the institutions, as shown in Figure 5. This trend is of
interest when taking other trends into consideration, namely the decrease in cases tar-
geting government personnel and cases with the justification of abusing public
power/resources.
Discussion
Mediated justice-seeking: platform affordances and DV practices
DV is a form of mediated justice-seeking, and participants’ chosen platforms are crucial
in shaping the practice (Trottier, 2020). Therefore, to further understand the changes
demonstrated in the results, an in-depth analysis of these platforms’ features and
affordances concerning DV practices is required.
In the late 1990s to early 2000s, China entered its web 2.0 era, which is signalled
by the emergence of various video-sharing websites, blogs, and some early-stage
social networking sites (Fang et al., 2014). Forums and BBSs are especially popular in
this era, including Mop Forum established in 1997, Tianya BBS in 1999, and Baidu BBS
in 2003. These platforms enable Chinese citizens to share experiences, emotions, and
opinions through the connected network (Yang, 2012). These include content that
angers citizens and challenges shared values and norms, such as infidelity and animal
abuse as shown in the justification of DV incidents. Afforded by certain features, these
forums and BBSs enable and encourage Chinese netizens to (re)act on offences they
discover online, hence DV as a phenomenon emerges and popularises.
One crucial feature of forums and BBSs that makes citizens feel more secure in voic-
ing their concerns on (perceived) social injustice is the relative anonymity these
Figure 4. DV participants’ repertoire in China between 2006 to 2018.
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platforms can provide users during its prime time in DV activities (2006–2011). Even
though identity verification on the Internet was discussed and experimented in a small
scale by the state since 2007 (Wang & Hu, 2016), it was not until 2012 when a universal
identity verification system was put in place (Fu et al., 2013). Another critical feature of
forums and BBSs is that they afford the formation of various communities, invoking DV
activities against offences that challenge their shared values and norms. Most of these
platforms connect people based on locations (e.g. local forums), lifestyle topics (e.g.
Tianya Club), or beliefs/ideologies (e.g. Utopia Forum), which frequently blurs the online
and offline boundaries (Yang, 2009, 2012). Because of the security provided by anonym-
ity and the shared identity provided by the community, citizens engaged in these com-
munities tend to feel more secure, obliged, and motivated to share experience and
emotions about social injustice that also concerns other members who share local
knowledge or values without the necessity to physically meet up. Some platforms also
have features that provide their users with more tangible incentives. For instance, Mop
Forum introduces the virtual currency system, in which users can acquire virtual cur-
rency when they provide useful information to other users’ inquiries (Pan, 2010). Such
incentive helps to create a larger pool of willing informants and thus produce more suc-
cessful doxing. With positive experiences of acquiring useful information, users are more
willing to make inquiries on the platform, leading to a cycle that fosters DV as a com-
monly accepted and utilised practice on these platforms.
After 2010, Sina Weibo starts to replace forums and BBSs as the primary platform for
DV activities and some of its features afforded DV activities differently compared to its
predecessors. Sina Weibo is a microblogging platform established in 2009, with similar
features to Twitter such as a character limit and the function of tagging other users with
“@” and following/participating in certain topics with “#”. The function of tagging other
Figure 5. case number percentage of DV case outcomes in China between 2006 to 2018.
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users facilitates DV participants to name and shame the target, as well as to inform rele-
vant official accounts of the target’s misbehaviour. The possibility of following/partici-
pating topics helps the participants to coordinate an ad hoc community that partakes in
DV activities, keep themselves updated about an incident without the need of establish-
ing a follower/followee relationship, and increase the visibility of an incident by posting
and commenting with the hashtags (Bruns & Burgess, 2015). Sina Weibo also allows
users to directly embed up to nine pictures in the post, which is taken advantage by
users for both presenting evidence and incorporating longer texts in a post by turning
them into pictures to circumvent the word count limit. Videos from some third-party
platforms are also allowed to be played embedded on Sina Weibo platform, which
makes it more convenient for visual evidence of offences to spread. By allowing longer
texts in the form of pictures, the platform facilitates storytelling for DV activities, which
is important for the initial circulation in these incidents (Trottier, 2020).
After 2014, WeChat also joins Sina Weibo and becomes a key platform to initiate or
participate in DV activities, and its half-public-half-private features (Wang & Gu, 2016)
change some patterns of how DV is conducted. WeChat is a software launched by
Tencent in early 2011 and soon develops into the most popular social media platform in
China (Tu, 2016), affording users to send texts, voice messages, videos, and pictures in
both private chats and group chats. WeChat groups can be created conveniently for
various purposes, and there can be from three up to 500 members in each group. In
addition to affording users’ interpersonal communication, group chats can also function
as a semi-public sphere to some degree (Wang & Gu, 2016), with pre-existing offline
communities with a large number of members that are organised based on location
(e.g., expat group, yezhuqun [property owners’ group]), employment (e.g., company
group), cultural identity (e.g., fan group), etc. Users are usually engaged in multiple
groups simultaneously, and they might or might not share the same ideologies, values,
and norms. WeChat groups, therefore, afford DV activities by providing pre-existing
communities, organisation and mobilisation possibilities, and potential sites of debate.
Similarly, WeChat Moments, a function allowing users to post their own or comment on
others’ status or things of interest, also offers DV participants a wide range of audiences
based on personal connections, and a site to initiate and/or mobilise others to partici-
pate in DV activities. Besides, WeChat also complicates DV activities with its public
account feature. This feature is established in 2012 and enables individuals and organi-
sations to send multi-media and longer content, unlike microblogging, to their subscrib-
ers, which can be regarded as media outlets (ibid.). With no word count limit and the
possibility to embed more visual material, WeChat public accounts can develop better
storytelling and more in-depth analysis or critique of an event; with the subscription sys-
tem, it is also easier for content not to be missed by users. Besides, the public account
content can be conveniently forwarded to users’ Moments and chats by clicking the
embedded “Forward” button, which also boosts the circulation and dissemination of
content —in this case, content related to DV activities.
Mediatised justice-seeking: media logic and DV practices
As the previous discussion explains, DV practices are very much influenced by relevant
affordances of platforms used by participants in different periods of times. However,
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some changes cannot be explained solely by different platform affordances. Instead,
considerations of how the Chinese society, especially institutions, have changed during
the thirteen years in relation to DV practice changes are essential.
One of the most visible changes—the decline of DV cases targeting government
personnel for abusing public power or resources after 2012—is highly related to
changes in Chinese political institutions. The official anti-corruption campaign led by
Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan in 2012 institutionalised anti-corruption activities to main-
tain the legitimacy of the CCP by solving one of the biggest sources of public anger—
corruption among CCP officials (Zhao, 2016). In December 2012, the party established
strict restrictions on government personnel’s public and private behaviours, set up
more official internal reporting channels online, and imposed severe punishment on
caught corrupted officials (Yuen, 2014). These implemented measures put government
officials under high pressure, and most corruption cases were dealt with within the
party. Hence, there is less corruption left for the public to expose. The second poten-
tial factor of the decline is the better (social) media literacy among government per-
sonnel. Many anti-corruption DV cases between 2009 to 2013 demonstrate the targets’
lack of media literacy leading to their demise in the social media era. Some targets
are discovered from their media presence, such as tianjiayan juzhang [director with
Sky-high-priced Cigarette]2 and biaoshu [watch uncle]3, who are spotted with luxurious
consumption on media coverage and therefore doxed; some are put under the spot-
light because their misuse of certain technology, such as Weibo kaifang [get a room on
Weibo] Director4. Due to the media literacy improvement among the overall Chinese
population and government’s efforts of educating officials to be cautious about their
public image on media (Wang, 2020; Zheng, 2013), opportunities to discover this type
of target decrease accordingly. Let us also not forget the tightened control over public
opinions since Xi took power in 2013 (Repnikova, 2017), which can be another factor
of less DV cases targeting corrupted officials that successfully gain citizens’ attention
and media coverage. Therefore, changes in the Chinese political institution influence
the justice-seeking via DV activities.
Meanwhile, as data has shown, institutions—especially the government—are
increasingly involved in the outcome of DV incidents, which can be attributed to the
increasing amount of verified accounts of government branches on Sina Weibo
(CNNIC, 2019) and the increasing popularity of reporting to institutions as a DV reper-
toire. Also, DV cases with justifications that coincide with trendy public debate topics
(such as sexual offence), that are more relatable (such as incivility), and supported by
the government (such as unpatriotic conducts), are on the rise in the researched
period. In addition, when choosing targets, Chinese DV participants start to give
slightly more attention to celebrities. These trends illustrate the affordances of social
media platforms and, more importantly, illustrate the mediatisation of Chinese citizens’
justice-seeking activities. Mediatisation theory has been widely applied in studying the
dynamics between media and society, especially in relation to politics, claiming that
media has become an independent social institution that has its own logic and can
challenge the logic of other social institutions (Hjarvard, 2008; Mazzoleni, 2017;
Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Str€omb€ack, 2008). This concept has also been used to dis-
cuss the interaction between digital media and political transformation in China (Sun,
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2007; Sun, 2014; Meng, 2016; Zhang, 2019; Wang, 2020). Follow this path, the author
explores how Chinese DV as a justice-seeking activity is mediatised based on three sig-
nals of mediatisation in the context of social media platforms concluded by Hjarvard
(2014): (i) the platform has created public spheres for other social institutions, thus
become the connecting node between them; (ii) its logic accommodates, as well as
challenges the logics of other social institutions, thus become an integral part of
them; (iii) (social)media-related personnel and processes became part of the organisa-
tional changes in other social institutions.
These signals can be identified in the case of Chinese DV participants seeking just-
ice on social media platforms. When shifting from forums/BBS to Sina Weibo, all actors
are better connected on the platform, including the target, participants, and various
social institutions, making Sina Weibo the connecting node.
Secondly, the popularity logic of social media platforms accommodates and chal-
lenges moral and/or political logics in the mediated justice-seeking process. Van Dijk
and Poell (2013) establish popularity as one of the social media logics, referring to the
platforms’ efforts to enhance the platform’s value and its users by strategically increas-
ing certain users’ visibility with various incentives. Such manipulation is afforded by
standardised metrics and mechanism such as “likes” and “trending topics”. Under this
logic, topics and content that can generate a large-scale emotional response, espe-
cially fear and anger about outer-groups (Berger & Milkman, 2012), are favoured by
platforms, and therefore strategically also favoured by social media content producers.
However, the logic of vigilantism or any form of justice-seeking is supposed to be
punishing and/or reintegrating perpetrators through various legal and/or informal
measures (Nussbaum, 2016). These two varying logics and their dialectical relationship
can be observed in Chinese DV cases. On the one hand, DV targets are punished
when they are made visible unwantedly (Trottier, 2017) by the participants with the
assistance of social media platform features and logics, illustrating how these
platforms’ popularity logic assists and accommodates the vigilantism logic. On the
other hand, the justice-seeking logic is challenged by social media’s popularity logic,
which can be observed in the changes of DV justifications and targets, when DV par-
ticipants tend to focus on specific offences and targets partially because more visibility
and sometimes rewards of varying kinds can be other outcomes of their DV activities.
The second signal of mediatisation proposed by Hjarvard (2014) can also be found in
the increasing involvement of media actors, especially key opinion leaders and
WeChat public accounts in the case development, taking advantage of the visibility
brought by DV activities to acquire visibility and other incentives provided by plat-
forms, which often interferes with the justice-seeking logic.
Lastly, Sina Weibo and WeChat have become an integral part of how actors interact
with each other in the justice-seeking process. Reporting to institutions online by tag-
ging relevant ones has become a crucial part of the standard repertoire combination
for DV participants. Deleting their social media content and cancelling their social
media accounts has also become a common practice in response to the online naming
and shaming for the target. These social media platforms, especially Sina Weibo, have
become the predominant locale for relevant institutions to respond to DV reports and
announce their decision on these matters. Hence, represented by Sina Weibo, social
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media platforms have been institutionalised by all actors, which signals the mediatised
justice-seeking in Chinese DV activities.
Conclusion
By constructing and analysing a case database of DV incidents between 2006 to 2018,
the research provides a comprehensive longitudinal review of DV activities in China.
By adopting a perspective of historical development, the author is able to identify pat-
terns and trends of Chinese DV activities instead of viewing them as a monolithic phe-
nomenon as commonly done before. The analyses on these patterns and trends
demonstrate that Chinese DV activities are mediated and more importantly mediatised
justice-seeking practices, which are not only afforded by social media platforms but
also influenced by their logic and conditioned by the ubiquitous state power in China.
This research, however, is not able to take into account DV activities that lack
media coverage. Research on such less visible Chinese DV incidents can also provide
crucial knowledge about the Chinese media landscape and socio-political conditions
because it can provide insights on factors that lead to a lack of news coverage and
the state’s censorship. Also, due to its scope and objective, this research only provides
an overall account of the traits of DV practices, which should be supplemented by
more detailed and in-depth qualitative analysis on motives, public discourse, and
social impacts of DV activities in China in order to further understand
the phenomenon.
Notes
1. In June 2011, Guo Meimei, a Chinese Internet celebrity, caused outrages on Sina Weibo and
Chinese society due to her posts of conspicuous consumptions and lavish lifestyle, which
also led to Chinese citizens distrust on Red Cross China because of Guo’s verification as a
senior manager to a company affiliated to the Red Cross.
2. In 2008, a district level official Zhou Jiugeng was found consuming luxurious cigarettes in
meetings covered by media, causing online suspicion and official investigation.
3. In 2012, a provincial level official Yang Dacai was given the nickname “watch uncle” or
“watch brother” because netizens found his luxury watch collection that is clearly beyond
his salary in his previous media presence, causing online outrage and later official
investigation.
4. In 2011, a city level official Xie Zhiqiang was mocked by netizens and then investigated by
the local government because he misunderstood Sina Weibo as private messaging platform
and flirted openly with his mistress.
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Appendix: Case number of DV justification in China from 2006 to 2018.
Year ( 20_ _ ) 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Abusing public power/resource 0 1 1 25 20 31 60 33 22 18 12 5 7
Animal brutality 2 1 0 3 9 4 5 4 8 10 10 16 11
Economic crime/conflict 1 0 0 4 8 3 7 12 4 7 11 9 10
Incivility 0 0 0 0 8 2 3 8 11 16 29 13 28
Indifference/ disrespect/insulting 0 0 0 7 4 15 18 13 10 7 20 10 21
Sexual offence 1 0 0 3 6 8 10 11 13 10 20 18 32
Sexual scandal 1 0 1 3 10 16 16 11 24 12 14 6 1
Show off wealth/ social status 0 0 3 6 9 16 9 3 7 0 2 3 4
Traffic transgression 0 0 0 3 6 10 15 5 7 6 5 6 7
Unpatriotic speech/ action 0 1 1 6 2 3 0 5 4 7 3 6 7
Unprofessional/ unsafe conduct 0 0 0 10 6 7 7 12 8 8 10 6 7
Violence/ physical harm 1 1 3 12 19 24 49 30 49 61 57 36 46
Others 0 2 2 5 6 4 4 5 3 3 6 7 15
Sum 6 6 11 87 113 143 203 152 170 165 199 141 196
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